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Jurisdiction 
The court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a), (5). 
Statement of the Issue, Standard of Review, and Preservation 
Tony Fuailemaa was shot and killed during a concert at a Salt Lake City nightclub. 
Based upon eyewitness testimony, a jury convicted Deon Clopten of murdering 
Mr. Fuailemaa. Mr. Clopten maintained that someone else—Freddie White—shot 
Mr. Fuailemaa. At trial, Mr. Clopten sought to introduce expert testimony concerning the 
fallibility of the eyewitness identification. The trial court initially ruled that 
Mr. Clopten's expert witness could testify, but later, taking cues from language in this 
court's decisions, the trial court reversed course and ruled that the testimony proffered 
would not assist the jury and would be cumulative of a jury instruction. 
Before the court of appeals, Mr. Clopten argued that (i) the trial court had erred in 
excluding the proffered expert testimony because the State's case hinged upon 
eyewitness identification and (ii) this error was not harmless because some eyewitness 
testimony implicated Mr. White—who had confessed to the shooting several times to 
different people—and had the expert testimony been admitted, there was a reasonable 
likelihood that he would not have been convicted. 
The panel reluctantly affirmed the expert's exclusion in light of a number of 
virtually unchallenged empirical studies demonstrating that jury instructions addressing 
eyewitness identification are useful, but not sufficient, to educate jurors about the 
potential weakness of such evidence. The panel considered itself bound by this court's 
decisions suggesting that it is never an abuse of discretion, State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 
123, 63 P.3d 621, or at least never a harmful abuse of discretion, State v. Hubbard, 2002 
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UT 45, 48 P.3d 953, to exclude such expert testimony because a jury instruction 
consistent with State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) is sufficient to communicate to 
jurors the fallibility of eyewitness identification. State v. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, 
186 P.3d 1004 ("Opinion"). 
This brief contends that this court should retreat from its pronouncements in 
Hubbard and Maestas that exclusion of expert testimony is neiliier an abuse of discretion 
nor harmful. Instead, this court should hold, and inform trial courts and the court of 
appeals, that expert testimony concerning the factors pertinent to determining the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony (i) is presumptively helpful to the trier of fact in 
understanding and weighing testimony of eyewitnesses under Rule 702, and (ii) is not 
cumulative of a jury instruction under Rule 403. While this holding would not mandate 
the admission of expert testimony, it would recognize that there are circumstances—such 
as those present here—in which (i) it is an abuse of discretion to exclude expert 
testimony and (ii) erroneously excluding expert testimony is not harmless simply because 
a Long instruction is given. 
Issue: Whether a timely request for expert testimony regarding the reliability of 
eyewitness identification should be presumed admissible. 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review de novo the decision of the court 
of appeals, not that of the trial court." State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, TJ20, 167 P.3d 
1074. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 252; 259-64; 639:8-11, 18; 644:12. 
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Determinative Provisions 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
No State sha l l . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
i 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the 
jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the 
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of 
facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 703 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue 
to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a 
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the 
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the 
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of 
fact alone. 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Clopten was convicted based upon eyewitness testimony identifying him as 
the person who shot Mr. Fuailemaa. (R. 609.) Mr. Clopten first went to trial in May of 
2005. (R. 643.) Prior to trial, Mr. Clopten sought to introduce the expert testimony of 
Dr. David H. Dodd, who would explain the relevant scientific evidence regarding 
circumstances which can affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification, including 
(i) cross-racial identifications; (ii) the impact of violence, trauma, and stress during the 
event; (iii) the tendency to focus upon a weapon instead of a person; (iv) facial 
recognition; (v) the suggestive nature of show-up identification procedures; 
(vi) suggestive statements by police officers before or after identification; (vi) the 
phenomenon of false confidence; and (vii) the counterintuitive nature of the science 
related to many of these factors. (R. 252; 259-64; 639:8-11, 18.) 
Mr. Clopten's trial counsel argued that if the trial court excluded Dr. Dodd's 
testimony, then counsel for Mr. Clopten would be precluded from discussing with the 
jury the scientific bases for challenging the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications 
because the Long instruction—the only information the jury would receive on the 
subject—is not evidence. (R. 639:14.) In addition, Mr. Clopten's counsel pointed out 
that many of the concerns with the eyewitness identifications in this case are not 
addressed in the Long instruction. (R. 640:4.) In response, the State argued that the 
science was "old" and that it was a "trend in Third District Court" to exclude expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness identifications and instead to use only the Long 
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instruction. (R. 639:16; 640:7.) Unfortunately, the State has correctly stated the trend 
within Utah's trial courts. 
In the first trial, the court initially ruled that Dr. Dodd could testify, later reversed 
course and ruled that Dr. Dodd could not testify, and then reversed course again and ruled 
that Dr. Dodd could testify, but only in general terms about the science of eyewitness 
identification without any "specifics in regards to this case." (R. 640:7.) The trial court 
apparently believed this limitation on Dr. Dodd's testimony was necessary so that 
credibility determinations about the identifications made by the eyewitnesses would be 
left to the jury. (R. 639:11.) Ultimately, these rulings were superseded in May 2005, 
when the court declared a mistrial after Mr. Clopten's counsel discovered a personal 
conflict stemming from his prior representation of a witness. (R. 643:160.) 
Before the second trial, Mr. Clopten again sought to introduce the expert 
testimony of Dr. Dodd. (R. 644:12.) This time, however, the court excluded the 
testimony because "the eyewitness [jury] instruction does an adequate job" and, 
according to the trial court, "Dr. Dodd's testimony . . . would only confuse the issue." 
(R. 644:12.) The trial court then stated that this proffered evidence was cumulative of 
non-evidence—the Long instruction: "Dr. Dodd's testimony [wa]s just superfluous and 
would have no bearing on the jury's decision." (R. 644:13.) The jury convicted 
Mr. Clopten. (R. 609.) 
On appeal, a panel of the court of appeals reluctantly affirmed based upon its 
interpretation of this court's precedent. (Opinion f21.) The panel's lead opinion, 
authored by Judge McHugh, noted that "courts and legal commentators have argued that 
jury instructions and cross-examination do not adequately address the vagaries of 
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eyewitness identification." (Opinion TI19.) Judge Thorne concurred to suggest that the 
boundaries of trial court discretion in excluding expert testimony should be revisited "in 
light of the persuasive authorities . . . explaining the shortcomings of eyewitness 
testimony." (Opinion f 32.) He "urge[d]" this court "to consider mandating the 
admission of such testimony in appropriate cases" because there is "little to lose and 
much to gain if criminal defendants are allowed to present expert testimony explaining 
how and why the eyewitness testimony in any particular case may be unreliable." 
(Opinion 1fl[32-33.) 
On November 13, 2008, this court granted Mr. Clopten's petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
II. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Clopten will divide his statement of facts into two sections. The first section 
will describe those facts that are undisputed and describe the chronology relevant events. 
The second section will describe the eyewitness identifications that link Mr. Clopten to 
Mr. Fuailemaa's killing. The circumstances in which these identifications were made 
demonstrate both that the science relating to the fallibility of eyewitness identifications 
would have assisted the trier of fact in this case and that the exclusion of the expert 
testimony was not a harmless error. 
A. Undisputed Facts Concerning Mr. Fuailemaa's shooting 
Tony Fuailemaa was shot and killed outside a Salt Lake City nightclub on 
December 1, 2002. (Opinion <P; 645:31, 44.) Deon Clopten was present at the time of 
the shooting along with three companions, one of whom was Freddie White. (Opinion 
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f3; R. 633:30.) Mr. Clopten, Mr. White, and one other of their companions were wearing 
red. (R. 634:181; 646:213; 645:84, 155-56.) 
The police later apprehended Mr. Clopten, Mr. White, and their two companions. 
(R. 633:85-99.) At the time of the arrest, Mr. Clopten was in the driver's seat of the 
vehicle, and Mr. White was sitting in the back on the passenger side. (R. 645:155-58; 
633:57.) Mr. Clopten was wearing red sweatpants, a red sweatshirt, red and white shoes, 
and a white t-shirt. (R. 645:155-56; 646:199.) Mr. White was wearing a red t-shirt, but 
at the scene of the arrest he was not wearing a red sweatshirt, which was later found in 
the car near where he had been sitting. (R. 646:213, 296-97; 647:453-54; Defendant's 
Ex. D-l.) One of Mr. Clopten's other companions was also wearing a red plaid shirt. 
(R. 634:181.) 
For some reason, the officers did not immediately seize as evidence the red 
sweatshirt discovered near Mr. White in the SUV, even though the shooter had been 
described as wearing red. And the police never conducted tests on this red sweatshirt. 
Instead, the car was impounded with the red sweatshirt inside, and the vehicle—with the 
sweatshirt—was released to a third party. (R. Defendant's Ex. D-l; R. 646:296-97; 
R.647:453-54.) | 
At trial, there was evidence that Mr. Clopten had confessed to the shooting to 
another prisoner at the jail who received a greatly reduced sentence on federal RICO 
charges in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Clopten. (R. 646:352, 369-70.) 
1 
However, a number other witnesses testified that Mr. White confessed to them that he 
was the shooter. (R. 647:491-92, 497-98, 500, 505-07, 522-23.) The foregoing is all of 
the relevant testimony unrelated to eyewitness identification. 
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B. The Eyewitness Identifications 
1. Shannon Pantoja 
Prior to the shooting, Mr. Fuailemaa pointed out Mr. Clopten to his girlfriend, 
Ms. Pantoja. Mr. Fuailemaa told her that he and Mr. Clopten had been incarcerated 
together and that Mr. Clopten "had had some problems with some of the homies out in 
the prison." (R. 645:35-36.) Ms. Pantoja had not previously met Mr. Clopten. As 
Ms. Pantoja and Mr. Fuailemaa left the concert, Ms. Pantoja saw the members of 
Mr. Clopten's group. (R. 645:37-38.) The men "were kind of like hiding behind-
crouched behind the building" and they "peeked out and then immediately ducked back 
again." (R. 645:38.) Ms. Pantoja testified that the shooter "came out with his arm 
extended. He had a gun in his hand." (R. 645:40.) Ms. Pantoja heard the shooter say, 
"What's up now," and then watched as Mr. Fuailemaa was shot twice in the head. 
(R. 645:44.) Ms. Pantoja also remembered that the weapon was a "small black handgun, 
like a Glock" and that she saw a flash and a spark from the gun during the shooting. 
(R. 645:81.) Later, contradicting this, Ms. Pantoja stated that she could not see the gun 
because Mr. Fuailemaa, who was six feet five inches tall and weighed 300 pounds, "was 
in the way." (R. 645:48, 86-88.) 
After hearing gun shots, one of the undercover officers attending the concert ran to 
Ms. Pantoja and asked, "Who did it?" (R. 645:45-46.) Ms. Pantoja did not answer by 
saying Mr. Clopten, but instead answered by saying, "It's the guy in all red."1 
(R. 645:46.) Ms. Pantoja confirmed at the trial and the preliminary hearing that 
1
 At the first trial, Ms. Pantoja's testimony was that she said "the one in red." (R. 641:18.) 
She told the police he had a red shirt on, but did not say anything about a red sweatshirt 
or sweatpants. (R. 646:224-25.) 
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Mr. Clopten, Mr. White, and another member of their group were wearing red the night 
of the shooting. (R. 645:84; 634:181.) Ms. Pantoja stated that Mr. Clopten was wearing 
red, but also described Mr. White as "the guy in red" during police questioning.2 
(R. 645:36, 84.) Ms. Pantoja also confirmed that one of Mr. Clopten's other companions 
was wearing a red plaid shirt. (R. 634:181.) 
Officers brought Ms. Pantoja to the scene of the arrest, telling her that they needed 
her "to go identify cem, see if they're the ones."3 (R. 645:50.) Ms. Pantoja participated 
in the field identification during which each person was presented to her one at a time in 
handcuffs. (R. 633:85-99, 118; R. 646:211.) Mr. Clopten was led out first. 
(R. 646:211.) He was wearing a red sweatshirt with writing on it, and Ms. Pantoja, who 
had been "hysterical" and "hyperventilating," identified him as the shooter. (R. 633:79; 
633:89; 645:156; 645:52; 641:49.) Mr. White was also led before Ms. Pantoja. At that 
time, he was wearing a red t-shirt, but not the red sweatshirt later found in the car near 
where Mr. White had been sitting. (R. 645:158; R. 646:213, 297.) 
Approximately 20 minutes after the show up at the arrest scene, Ms. Pantoja was 
shown a photo array of the four suspects at the police station. She identified Mr. Clopten 
as the shooter. (R. 634:157.) Ms. Pantoja also identified Mr. Clopten as the shooter 
during a January 2004 police lineup, 13 months after the shooting, and then again at trial 
in 2005. (R. 634:158; 645:55-58.) Despite the fact of these identifications, under police 
2
 In her testimony at trial, Ms. Pantoja repeatedly stated that Mr. White had a white coat, 
but no other witnesses confirmed her recollection, and, in fact, their testimony expressly 
contradicted it. Additionally, Mr. White did not have white coat when arrested after the 
shooting. (R. 645:84; 646:213, 218-19.) 
At the first trial, Ms. Pantoja testified that the police had "some people pulled over, you 
know, suspects in Davis County." And that the police told her "You need to identify 
these people." (R. 641:52.) 
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questioning 2 days after the shooting, Ms. Pantoja did not have a clear memory of seeing 
Mr. Clopten during the concert. Rather, her memory was based on the same group of 
four men being together before the concert and at the scene of the shooting. (R. 645:86, 
90-93.) Ms. Pantoja also did not remember any writing on the shooter's red clothing, 
although Mr. Clopten's clothing had writing on it. (R. 641:49-50.) 
In contrast to Ms. Pantoja's initial identifications, which lacked clarity, both at the 
January 2004 preliminary hearing—over one year after the shooting—and at trial, 
Ms. Pantoja claimed to have a clear memory of Mr. Clopten prior to the concert and a 
clear memory of Mr. Clopten's distinctive hairline, even though every witness other than 
Ms. Pantoja stated that the shooter had the hood of the red sweatshirt up at the time of the 
shooting. (R. 633:29; 646:247, 263, 313; 647:479.) This "clear memory" Ms. Pantoja 
reported to the jury apparently had developed after she saw Mr. Clopten in the following 
circumstances after the shooting: (i) a show-up, (ii) a photo-array, (iii) a line-up, (iv) a 
preliminary hearing, and (v) during the first trial. (R. 645:93-94; R. 641:53; 634:157.) 
2. Melissa Valdez 
Melissa Valdez also attended the concert and witnessed Mr. Fuailemaa's murder. 
Before the concert, Ms. Valdez talked to a group of men about getting tickets. 
(R. 646:243-44.) One of the men was wearing red pants and a red sweatshirt. 
(R.:646:246-47.) As Ms. Valdez was leaving, she saw a man in a red sweatsuit whom 
she thought she had spoken with earlier. (Id.) She asked the man if he had obtained 
tickets, and the man indicated that he had. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Ms. Valdez happened 
to look back over her shoulder. (R. 646:249.) At that moment, she saw a man in a red 
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hooded sweatshirt standing behind the victim with his right arm extended and hi tiding 
what appeared to be a gun i, I""1 M(v244), M)\,) 
Ms. Valdez identified Mr. Clopten as the shooter in a photo ai i o and II n ul. 
(R. 646:247, 254-55.) Yet she ,* shooting, Ms. Valdez stated that the shooter 
luitl been wearing a "single pull-over sweatshirt, one that did not zip up" w ilh one big 
pocket" and no logos. (R. 646i161 (• I I Hie also told the police that the shooter was 
wearing sweatpants, but not matching red sweatpants. (R. 646:262-63.) iV, • , pkn's 
sweatshirt had a zipper and l<-™~ *- ' ' nl two pockets rather then one across the front. 
( - 646:262-64.) vlr. Clopten was wearing matching red sweatpants. 
(R. 645:155-56.) Additional!}. Hlez's companion told Mr. Clopten's previous 
counsel that the driver of the white SUV was not the shooter. (R.647:486.) Ke\ oral 
witnesses confirmed that Mr. Cloptett \\ ho was di iving the vehicle when apprehended 
I police—drove the vehicle from the scene. (R. 633:57; 646:198-202.) 
3. Andre Ham by 
Viiili e I lamby—one of Mr. Clopten's companions at the concert—also w if newed 
the shooting and testified for the State Mi 1 lanib> mitiallv told police that he was in the 
car at tiio tune of the shooting and did not witness it. (R.646:326.) Mr. Hamby's story 
changed after the police told him that he could either go to jail for "many years" or be a 
witness, and thai because there were other witnesses, there was "no saving" Mr. Clopten. 
(R. 646:331-32.) After the police told Mr liamln lli.it Mi Clopten had been identified 
as the shooter, I\ I r I lamby stated that he didn't want to go to prison and related a story 
consistent with Mr. Clopten being the shootei 11! 646:332-33.) 
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Mr. Hamby also testified that after the shooting he, Mr. Clopten, Mr. White, and 
another person "drove off in the same vehicle. (R. 633:57.) Mr. Hamby stated that he 
was in the back seat behind the driver, Mr. White was in the back seat on the passenger 
side of the vehicle, and Mr. Clopten drove the vehicle. (Id.) 
4. Bruce and Brenda Aimone 
Two other witnesses observed the shooting and testified at trial, but their 
testimony indicated that Mr. White, not Mr. Clopten, had been the shooter. Bruce 
Aimone and his wife Brenda were staying on the eleventh floor of the Marriott Hotel the 
night of the shooting. (R. 646:302.) The Aimones saw four people running away from 
Mr. Fuailemaa toward an SUV. (R. 646:303-4.) Mr. Aimone testified that he saw the 
person in a red jacket or red fleece coat enter the SUV on the passenger side. 
(R. 646:304-5.) Mrs. Aimone also testified at trial that there was "no doubt" that the 
individual with the red jacket entered the passenger side door. (R. 646:313.) Again, the 
uncontroverted testimony is that Mr. Clopten was, at all times, the driver of the vehicle, 
not a passenger. 
Based upon this evidence and the absence of Dr. Dodd's testimony, the jury 
convicted Mr. Clopten. (R. 609.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
This court's recent decisions \u\ r Irli f rial courts with the impression that they 
.hi mid exclude expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
and the court of appeals with the impression that all such exclusions should be affirmed. 
As the State commented to the trial court, it is the "trend in Third District Low < > 
exclude such testimony, a trend (he li ial < t mi ( continued ( K 640*7.) Relying upon 
language in this court's recent decisions, the trial court concluded that expert testimoih 
would not assist the jury and w o11M I • u >i e helpful than a Long instruction. Yet the 
empirical research conclusively demonstrates otherwise. In most cases, a jur> mstt action 
is not a sufficient means of informing imois about the problems with eyewitness 
identification Instead, expert testimony is necessary to explain the scientific research 
underlying its counterintuitive 1 indulge SIK li a > llti laik of correlation between an 
eyewitness' certainty in identifying someone and the accuracy of the identification 
This court should send a dn .oivnt message to trial courts and the court of appeals, 
\ me consistent with the science. Specifically, this court should take the position ; 
whenever the State introduces testimony «»l an eyewitness to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, expert testimony concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identifleal ions 
is presumed to "assist the trier of fact" undn Rule HP 1 he State could rebut this 
presumption b\ demonstrating that expert testimony would not assist the trier of fact in a 
particular case due to, for example, the close relationship between the identifier and 
identifiee. However, if the State cannot rebut the presumption, then a trial court would 
abuse its discretion if it excluded the expert testi i n on I urther, this court should 
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conclude that improperly excluding expert testimony is not harmless error simply 
because a Long instruction is given. 
Applying the foregoing standard to this case, it is apparent that the trial court 
abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Clopten's proffered expert testimony on the ground 
that the testimony would be unhelpful to the jury and cumulative of the Long instruction. 
Under the approach proposed, which accords with the scientific evidence, the trial court 
would have allowed Dr. Dodd to testify because the State offered no grounds to rebut the 
presumption that the expert testimony would assist the jury. 
Further, in the present case the error was not harmless. First, the fact that a Long 
instruction was given does not render the exclusion of Dr. Dodd's testimony harmless. 
The relevant science overwhelmingly demonstrates that a jury instruction is not an 
adequate substitute for expert testimony. Second, with the Long instruction properly 
classified as insufficient, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached 
a different result. A number of studies demonstrate that juries rely heavily on eyewitness 
testimony, even when that identification is questionable. In addition, there is an 
abundance of evidence—including numerous confessions—that Mr. White shot 
Mr. Fuailemaa. Had Dr. Dodd testified, the jury may have found reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Clopten shot Mr. Fuailemaa. Given the harmfulness of this error, the court should 
order a new trial. 
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Argument 
Mistaken eyewitness identification is (he leading cause of wrongful convictions in 
(In 11 tilled States, accounting for 88% of wrongful rape convictions and 50% ol wrongtul 
murder convictions between 198<> dml H)()\ 11\ I \ p \ . at J(h )* I here is a body of 
growing and virtually undisputed "scientific evidence that eyewitness testimony is 
systematically fallible in ways that lead away from the truth and towards unjust verdicts." 
(Fct. Apx. at 308.)5 The root of the problem is the reluctance of juries to accept the truth 
that eyewitness testimony is fallible, iis.i.nly because the reasons for its fallibility are 
"quite counterintuitive and hardly commonsensical." (Pet. Apx. at 107-08.)" Jurors 
therefore must be properly educated ah nil the weakness of eyewitness identification 
before I hey can be expected to evaluate properly an eyewitness identification. 
Over the last 30 years, this court has ad<!nM snl the need for juror education in the 
science relevant to eyewitness identification, but not with a consistent approach. It has 
mandated that a jury instruction be given n huh spt, lis tut in conclusory fashion the 
faetoi A* levant to determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony. And it has given 
trial courts discretion in deciding whether in allow expert testimony on the same subject. 
I i esitlt has been two steps forward and one back. Trial courts have interpreted 
this court's decisions that review the exclusion of expert testimony as instructing them to 
4
 Timothy P. OToole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Braithwaite Revisited: Towards a 
New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures, 41 Valparaiso L. R. 109, 110 (2006). 
5
 Edward Stein, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science 
Research on Eyewitness Identification, 2 Law, Probability & Risk 295, 297 (2003). 
6
 Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of 
Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 3, 23, 28 (June 2006). 
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presume that as long as the required instruction is given, then expert testimony is not 
helpful to the jury and, therefore, is presumptively inadmissible. The net effect is that 
Utah trial courts have adopted a per se rule against the admissibility of expert testimony. 
The dangers of this practice are highlighted by the body of scientific evidence 
demonstrating that jury instructions alone are often insufficient to communicate 
effectively the findings of science to jurors, and, therefore, expert testimony is necessary 
to assist the trier of fact. 
Because the scientific evidence is at odds with the practice in Utah's trial courts, 
this court should chart a different course. It is proposed that this court adopt the 
following approach: Whenever the State introduces testimony of an eyewitness to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, qualified expert testimony concerning the fallibility of 
eyewitness identifications is presumed to '"assist the trier of fact" under Rule 702 and 
should be admitted unless the State can rebut this presumption by demonstrating that 
expert testimony would not assist the trier of fact in a particular case. 
This brief candidly recognizes that the course it argues for diverges from that 
charted by this court's precedents, a course which has resulted, in practice, in exclusive 
reliance on jury instructions. In arguing for a new direction, this brief proceeds in six 
stages. First, it outlines the evolution of Utah law with regard to eyewitness 
identifications. Second, it demonstrates the incompatibility of current Utah law (and 
practice) with the scientific evidence. Third, it draws upon the scientific evidence to 
advocate for the adoption of a presumption that expert testimony is helpful to jurors. 
Fourth, it explains why the alternative approaches of other jurisdictions are less 
consistent with the scientific evidence than the approach urged in this brief. Fifth, it 
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demonstrate i hat n the trial court here had applied a presumption that Dr. Dot It I' 
testimony would have been helpful to the jury, then the trial court would not have 
excluded 1 )i 1 )odd\ testimony. Finally, it demonstrates that the trial court's error was 
not harmless, and, therefore, a new trial is warranted. 
I. Trial Courts Have Interpreted This Court's Jurisprudence as Articulating a 
Presumption That Expert Testimony Concerning Eyewitness Identifications 
Is Not Helpful to Juries 
This court has struggled for almost 30 years with how trial courts should inform 
juries about the myriad of problems with eyewitness identification. The science 
regarding problems with eyewitness testimony was first described in briefs submitted in 
this court in 11)81, but rather than adopi an evidential) approach grounded in this science, 
the court ; ! decision of whether to admit expert testimony on the subject entirely to 
the discretion ofthe trial court. State v. Griffin, 62 0 V. M WX. IXI (Utah 1981). The 
next year the u mi I lol lowed Griffin in upholding the exclusion of expert testimony on the 
ground that the testimony would constitute a "lecture to llie ft itN about how they should 
perform their duties State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982). In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham, w arned that " [t]he inherent dangers of 
good faith erroi in e\ e\\ itness identification are widely recognized," and urged the court 
to minimize the dangers of wrongful convictions by at least instructing juries about the 
problems inherent in such testimony. Id. at 62-66. 
In 1986 in State v. Long, the court heeded Justice Stewart's advice '? I P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986). In Long, this court first acknowledged the substantial scientific evidence on 
the fallibility of eyewitness testimony, including a go\ eminent studj conducted in Great 
Britain that went so far as to recommend that, in light ofthe inherent problems with this 
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form of uncorroborated evidence, visual identification alone should never be a basis for a 
conviction unless special circumstances exist. Id. at 491. While this court declined to go 
that far in 1986, it did not reject the British position out of hand, noting that "[s]uch a 
bold departure will have to await further empirical evidence that less radical alternatives 
do not ameliorate the problem." Id, at 492. The less radical alternative adopted by the 
court was a mandatory cautionary jury instruction whenever (i) "eyewitness identification 
[was] a central issue in a case" and (ii) the defendant requests an instruction. Id. 
For the next 16 years, Utah appellate courts routinely affirmed the decisions of 
trial courts to exclude expert testimony on the ground that a Long instruction was 
adequate protection against unwarranted reliance upon eyewitness identifications. State 
v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (deferring to trial court's 
determination that expert testimony on eyewitness identifications was unnecessary and a 
Long instruction adequately educated the jury about the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony); State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,Wl-44, 27 P.3d 1133 (trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding eyewitness expert testimony that "did not deal with the 
specific facts from th[e] case");7 State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ffi[10, 13, 15, 48 P.3d 953 
(trial court's exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion 
7
 Ironically, the expert testimony was excluded in Butterfield because it did not deal with 
the specific facts of the case, while in other cases, the court cautions that the expert may 
invade the province of the jury by making a conclusion about the ultimate issue of 
credibility of the eyewitness identification. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at TJ44; Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45 at ^|15. These seemingly contradictory descriptions may be remedied by this 
court through clarification that the expert should discuss the unreliability of eyewitness 
identifications by explaining the specific factors relevant to the identifications at issue in 
the case, but that the expert cannot opine that a particular witness's identification was in 
fact unreliable. The expert should be able to explain, however, what the science shows 
about the type of identification a particular witness has made, e.g., cross-racial or where 
focus is likely to be on a weapon, not the person. 
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where an instruction was given and the testimony would have "direct I \ 01 nuliKUly" 
stepped into the province oi the fun in iK I u mine credibility); State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 
'!' ' J ' I I >X (n P >d 621 (upholding trial court's decision to exclude expert trsfnnonv) 
A few of these cases wan. ml \ del ailed discussion, as they contain the language 
tnal u Kills now rely upon to exclude expert testimony as a matter of IOUIM (I* 639*16; 
640:7 ) In Hubbard, this court re\ < 11 e« 1 t<) 1 he Griffin characterization of expert testimony 
as a nteti "lecture" to the jury. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at ^13-20. Wlul< llu.umit 
reiterated that trial courts had discretion to determine whether to admit expert testimony, 
t k * i a clear cautionary note that an expert's "lecture" could "step| | into11 ie 
province of the jury." Id. at j^ 15 * hen stated that the substance of any expert 
testimony "can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a (in \ 
instruction." IdL at ^[17. Even assuming it was error to exclude expert testimony, the 
u mi n uiiM be per se harmless provided a Long instruction was given * ay. Id. at 
T[20 (where cautionary instruction is given I he expert testimony would not have had "a 
aibstantiai inliiienee in bringing about a different verdict"). 
It is not difficult to see why trial eolith find in this language an explicit incentive 
to rejeel all proffered expert testimony and rely exclusively on the Long mslim turn I f 
expert testimony is a mere "lecture" that touiimiiiiiates the same information as a Long 
instuu linn, thai ti KII courts will never be reversed if they exclude expert testimony and 
give a Long instruction because any erroi » ; osr idead harmless. Yet if they admit 
the testimony I In n they risk reversal. In fact, Utah appellate courts have ne\ er re\ ersed 
a trial court decision to exclude such testinioi i \ and instead have repeatedly explained 
that a Long instruction is an adequate substitute for expert testimony. 
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This court's subsequent decision in Maestas reinforced this message by suggesting 
that it is never an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony. Maestas, 2002 UT 123 
at 1fl[76, 138. In Maestas, Justice Russon, joined by Chief Justice Howe, concluded that 
either cross-examination or an appropriate jury instruction will serve to inform the jury of 
any deficiency in eyewitness testimony. Id. at 1(138. Justice Durrant, joined by Justice 
Wilkins, alternatively concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that expert testimony would intrude on the jury's role as fact finder. Id at 
Y74. Accordingly, four members of the court concluded that the expert testimony would 
not "assist the trier of fact" under Rule 702. IdL at 1fi|73-76. 
Justice Durham dissented, essentially forecasting the issue now before the court 
and summarizing the current scientific research. She stated that jury instructions "can 
only give the jury general information, which itself only comes after all the evidence is 
in. Expert testimony, targeted to the specific evidence in a case, will be far more helpful 
to the jury in considering whether witnesses are in fact correct in identifying a particular 
defendant as a perpetrator. Recent experience . . . has conclusively established that 
eyewitnesses can be mistaken, for many reasons that are beyond the general knowledge 
and experience of the average juror." Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at [^23 (citing Gary L. 
Wells, http:www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/homepage.htm). 
Put in the context of current Utah law, a Long instruction illustrates the 
shortcomings of an "instruction only" approach. That standard form instruction explains, 
in very general terms, the science of eyewitness identification, but does not explain the 
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science or how the science applies to a particular identification. Nor could am i oncise, 
standard form instruction adequately < onve\ to a jury why the findings regarding the 
t tltthilitv ot eyewitness testimony are so counterintuitive. Indeed, empiiu.il research 
demonstrates that over hall oi ti ial (udges are as unaware as the average juror of the 
inherently unreliable nature of eyewitness identifications. (Pet. Apx. at 480, 4K2.)9 Yet 
the empirical research demonstrates that "expert testimony is the only legal safeguard that 
is effective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness factors." (Pet. Apx. at 480, 48° lm \n«I 
the practice of using jury instructions to dispense with the need for expert testimony has 
received "almost universal" criticism. (Pet. Apx. at 169.)11 
To reverse this trend, and to bring I 'tali practice into line with the overwhelming 
scientific concerns, trial courts need to be educated about the importance of this science 
and of expert testimony. It is therefore for this court to explain that expert testimony 
t \ piccills aids juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony in ways that neither stocl \u\ y 
instructions nor cross-examination can, in*I In nlopi an evidentiary presumption that 
aippoi I . ihc admission of such evidence. 
In this case, the instruction failed to inform the jury about two critical and relevant 
issues: (i) the counterintuitive effect of weapon focus and (ii) the lack of a correlation 
between a witness's confidence and the actual accuracy of her identification. Dr. Dodd's 
testimony would have reached each of these issues. 
9
 Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About 
Eyewitness Testimony, 11 Applied Cognitive Psych. 427, 433, 435 (2004) (only 32% of 
judges surveyed correctly disagreed with a statement that eyewitness confidence is a 
good indicator of identification accuracy) 
10
 Id, at 433, 435. 
11
 Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of 
Glasses for the Jury, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1013, 1062 (1995). 
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II. Utah Law Is Not In Line With the Growing Body of Undisputed Scientific 
Evidence 
This court has long recognized the need for Utah law to evolve in response to new 
developments regarding scientific evidence. Responding to the evolving science 
concerning eyewitness testimony, this court noted more than 20 years ago that "a 
cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea" and "[f]ull evaluation of the efficacy of 
cautionary instructions must await further experience." Long, 721 P.2d at 492 n.5 
(emphasis added). Succeeding years have brought that further experience, which has 
demonstrated that a jury instruction alone is generally inadequate. Because a jury 
instruction "points only to certain factors without explaining the relative impact those 
factors have on memory or identification accuracy," an instruction is only "minimally 
effective." (Pet. Apx. at 253.)12 In fact, some research demonstrates no beneficial effect 
from jury instructions. (Pet. Apx. at 245.)13 Because expert testimony will "focus[] the 
jury's attention on those factors most likely to affect the accuracy of an eyewitness 
identification," testimony is a more effective mechanism to address the fallibility of 
eyewitness testimony. (Pet. Apx. at 253.)14 Jury instructions simply cannot "explain the 
complexities about perception and memory in a way a properly qualified expert witness 
can." (Pet. Apx. at 108.)15 
For example, a review of several experiments on the effectiveness of jury 
instructions concluded that there is "little evidence that judges' instructions concerning 
Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury 
Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43, 52 (1989). 
13
 Id, at 44. 
14
 Id at 52. 
15
 Fradella, supra note 6, at 28. 
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(lie reliability of eyewitness identification enhance juror sensitivity to eyewitness 
identification evidence."16 (Pet Ap\ ,il (>7 I1 Priliaps most telling, manipulating the 
i \ intent of the instructions and altering the timing of the instructions does not lead to any 
improvement. (Id.) In fact, some evident e suggests that instructions alone "actually 
reduced juror sensitivity to witnessing and identification conditions." (Id. (emphasis 
added).) 
For this reason, experts have concluded "that the judges' instructions do not serve 
as an effective safeguard against mistaken identifications and convictions and that expert 
testimony is therefore more effective than judges' instructions as a safeguard." (Id. at 
68.) Put more bluntly, "Judges and attornc) s whu cling to traditional methods of 
b
 See also Penrod & Cutler, supra note 12, at 44 (Pet. Apx. at 245) ("Judges' 
instructions, designed to aid the jury in evaluating eyewitness evidence, have no 
beneficial effect on jury decisionmaking."); Fredric D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive 
You?: Expert Psychological Testmony of the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 
29 Stan. L. Rev. 969, 1004 (1976-1977) (Pet. Apx. at 409) ("Instructions alone cannot 
supply the jury with any data or information that would assist them in evaluating the 
reliability of a particular witness' identification."); Cindy O'Hagan, When Seeing is Not 
Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 Geo. L. J. 741, 753 (1993) 
(Pet. Apx. at 184) (stating that "instructions are usually buried in a long and complicated 
charge by the judge" at the end of trial when "most jurors have already made their 
decisions, and an instruction by the judge is unlikely to change their minds"); Stein, supra 
note 8, at 302 (Pet. Apx. at 310) ("Being told the results of scientific research in a 
conclusory manner by a judge is not a more effective way of educating a jury about 
cognitive biases and errors involved in eyewitness identification."); Peter J. Cohen, How 
Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness 
Identification, 16 Pace L. Rev. 237, 272 (1996) (Pet. Apx. at 36) ("There is no scientific 
evidence that cautionary jury instructions . . . are effective."). 
17
 Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, 
Psychology, and the Law 263 (1995). 
18
 Id. at 264. 
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instructing jurors . . . are not serving well the interests of jurors, innocent defendants, or 
the public.55 (IdL at 68-D.)19 
In contrast, studies "indicate that expert psychological testimony can serve as a 
safeguard against mistaken identification.55 (Pet. Apx. at 57.)20 "Expert testimony 
appears to have the beneficial effect of educating jurors about factors that influence 
eyewitness identification and enhancing their reliance on those factors when rendering 
decisions in eyewitness cases.55 (Id.) The testimony does not invade the province of the 
jury, but does facilitate the jury's "greater reliance on witnessing and identification 
conditions in determining the probability that the identification was correct.55 (Pet .Apx. 
at 278.) There is no indication, however, that expert testimony causes jurors to question 
eyewitness credibility, to become generally skeptical of the accuracy of identifications, or 
91 
to be less likely to believe a defendant is guilty. (Id.) In other words, expert testimony 
helps jurors make better decisions, but does not make decisions for them. 
A. Specific Factors that Evade Appropriate Explanation in a Jury 
Instruction 
The most crucial shortcoming of a Long instruction is that it cannot effectively 
explain the science behind the factors it instructs the jury to consider, and inform them of 
99 
why they are not likely to recognize the flaws in eyewitness testimony. (Pet. Apx. at 
iy
 Id at 268. 
20
 Id at 250. 
21
 Penrod & Cutler, supra note 12, at 77. 
22
 See also 05Hagan, supra note 16, at 755 (Pet. Apx. at 186) ("[T]he expert testimony 
can explain the unreliability of the memory process and the different factors that can 
distort memory retrieval,55 and "unlike a jury instruction, the live testimony of an expert 
can help dilute a jury's excessive reliance on eyewitness identifications.55); Stein, supra 
note 8, at 300 (Pet. Apx. at 309) (recognizing that the results of the empirical research are 
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409.) In Long, this court mandated that the jury be instructed to "take into account both 
the strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification 
was made." Long, 721 P.2d at 493 n.7. The science now demonstrates, however, that 
such instructions are an inadequate means of educating juries about problems involving 
an eyewitness's perception, retention of that perception, and later retrieval of information. 
For example, the impact of stress or fright—both of which were present during the 
identifications here—on perception and memory is very complex and counterintuitive. 
High levels of stress have a negative impact on the accuracy of perception and memory, 
but moderate levels of stress may be beneficial to perception and memory. (Pet. Apx. at 
104.)24 According to the latest research, it is counterintuitive to most jurors that stress 
could diminish, rather than enhance, the ability of a witness to identify a perpetrator 
accurately. (Pet. Apx. at 88.)25 Thus, an explanation of the science underlying the jury 
instruction is crucial both to overcome juror skepticism and to ensure that jurors 
understand the subtle relationship between stress, perception, and memory, only some of 
which is, or could reasonably be, conveyed in a jury instruction. 
"counterintuitive" and that expert testimony "would help the trier of fact appropriately 
weigh eyewitness testimony"). 
Woodier, supra note 16, at 1004 ("Because the real dangers inherent in eyewitness 
identifications are not obvious to the lay juror, the cautionary instructions can be effective 
only if the judge goes beyond calling the issue to the jury's attention."). 
Fradella, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
Jules Epstein, Tri-State Vagaires: The Varying Responses of Delaware, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania to the Phenomenon of Mistaken Identifications, 12 Widener L.R. 327, 
346 (2006). 
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Another important circumstance is the presence of a weapon, a circumstance 
present here. The research concerning "weapon focus"26 is counterintuitive. Most jurors 
believe that the presence of a weapon will make the witness's memory more reliable, 
when, in fact, the opposite is true. (Pet. Apx. at 88.)27 When a weapon is present the 
accuracy of the identification decreases because the witness focuses on the weapon rather 
than other aspects of the event, including the face of the person, with the weapon. (Pet. 
Apx. at 104.)28 And this effect is "magnified when the use of a weapon comes as a 
surprise to a witness." (Id.) Despite these problems, jurors are more likely to convict 
when a weapon was present. (Pet. Apx. at 261, 278.) Expert testimony can help jurors 
understand the effects of weapon focus. A jury instruction—even if it becomes a 
scientific treatise—cannot perform the same function. (Pet. Apx. at 301-02.)30 
Another example of the inability of a Long instruction to address adequately the 
relevant science is in its direction to the jury to consider the "strength of identification." 
The scientific studies demonstrate that the "strength of identification," like weapon focus, 
is a counterintuitive factor. Witness confidence and the accuracy of the resulting 
identification have no relationship. And only 17% of the population is aware of this lack 
of correlation. (Pet. Apx. at 89.)31 When expert testimony is presented, however, 
26
 Weapon focus has been described as "the phenomenon of a crime witness or victim 
unconsciously directing his or her attention away from the perpetrator's face and toward 
an actual or perceived weapon." Epstein, supra note 25, at 334 (Pet. Apx. at 76). 
27
 Epstein, supra note 25, at 346. 
Fradella, supra note 6, at 14. 
29
 Penrod & Cutler, supra note 12, at 60, 77. 
30
 Steven Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: 
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psych. Pub. Pol. & L. 817, 839 (1995). 
31
 Epstein, supra note 25, at 347. 
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"confidence is viewed as less relevant among jurors." (Pet. Apx. at 301.) "Thus, expert 
testimony appears to improve juror knowledge for the confidence-accuracy relation." 
(14) 
This empirical research again demonstrates that expert testimony is "a more 
effective solution" to the need for juror education and that "jury instructions should be 
used as a complement to the expert testimony, not as a substitute." (Pet. Apx. at 185-
86.) This court should reconsider its prior jurisprudence suggesting otherwise. 
B. The Impact of Eyewitness Testimony In Cases Involving 
Corroborating Evidence 
Expert testimony is helpful even in cases where other evidence is supportive of the 
eyewitness testimony. Research indicates that "sometimes eyewitness identifications are 
incorrect even when there is corroborative evidence." (Pet. Apx. at 150.)34 Juror reliance 
upon eyewitness identification in such cases is troublesome precisely because jurors 
place disproportionate emphasis on the eyewitness evidence. 
In one study, for example, when only the corroborative evidence was admitted but 
not the eyewitness testimony, 18% of the jurors that voted for conviction, but when the 
eyewitness testimony was added, 72% voted for conviction. (Id.) Even more 
problematic, when researchers informed jurors that the only eyewitness was legally blind 
and was not wearing glasses during the crime, 68% still voted for conviction. (Id.) 
Eyewitness testimony "produces a perverse result, in that a defendant who would not 
Penrod & Cutler, supra note 30, at 839. 
O'Hagan, supra note 16, at 754-55. 
Handberg, supra note 11, at 1043. 
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have been convicted based solely on scant circumstantial evidence may well be convicted 
if there is an unreliable identification to go along with that evidence."35 (Id.) 
Because of the "demonstrably persuasive impact identifications have on juries," 
expert testimony should be presumed helpful to the jury in all cases involving eyewitness 
identifications, "not only when identifications are the only evidence presented." (Pet. 
Apx. at 198.)36 The weight given to eyewitness testimony means it presents risks 
whenever admitted, "not merely when [it is] the only evidence admitted at trial." (Pet. 
Apx. at 200.) Juries should understand "why the eyewitnesses' identifications [are] 
inherently unreliable" through the presentation of "a scientific, professional perspective," 
for which there is no substitute. Ferensic v. Birkett 501 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(emphasis in original). Therefore, anytime eyewitness testimony is in play, expert 
testimony should be presumed to be helpful to the trier of fact. 
III. Utah Should Adopt a Presumption that Expert Testimony Will Assist the 
Trier of Fact Under Rule 702 
Utah law should reflect the virtually undisputed science indicating that expert 
testimony helps to sensitize jurors to the counterintuitive fallibility of eyewitness 
identification. To accomplish this, the court should hold that expert testimony is 
presumptively helpful to the trier of fact under Rule 702. In theory, such a presumption 
will not increase the number of cases in which expert testimony is appropriate, but will 
See also O'Hagan, supra note 16, at 752 (Pet. Apx. at 183) (recognizing that "the 
existence of other evidence will not eradicate the jury's reliance on the identification" 
and that "even weak 'corroboration' can serve to justify the jury's reliance on the 
identification"). 
36
 Id at 767. 
37
 Id. at 769. 
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instead shift the burden to the party relying upon eyewitness testimony to demonstrate 
that expert testimony will not be helpful in a particular case. In practice, however, a 
presumption will result in trial courts more often allowing expert testimony and reversing 
what the State calls the "trend in Third District Court" to exclude expert testimony as a 
matter of course. (R. 639:16; 640:7.) 
It is suggested that this court adopt a presumption that qualified expert testimony 
concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identifications is presumed to "assist the trier of 
fact" under Rule 702.39 This court should also make clear that under Rule 403 expert 
testimony has probative value independent of, and in addition to, a Long instruction, for 
the reasons discussed in the previous section. 
This approach, both in theory and in operation, would reflect the scientific 
consensus: "[E]xpert testimony on eyewitness identifications . . . is now universally 
recognized as scientifically valid and of aid to the trier of fact for admissibility purposes.'^ 
Ferensic v. Birkett 501 F.3d 469, 482 (6th Cir. 2007) (alterations and quotations 
omitted). Because "jurors tend to be unduly receptive to, rather than skeptical of, 
While the State most often relies upon eyewitness testimony to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, at times it is the defendant that introduces eyewitness testimony to 
prove, for example, an alibi. In these circumstances, the State should enjoy a 
presumption the expert testimony concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identification 
will assist the trier of fact. 
39
 Evidentiary presumptions have been recognized in other contexts. See e.g., Clark v. 
Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that, under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(8), official public reports are "presumed admissible" unless the other party 
"comefs] forward with some evidence which would impugn its trustworthiness"); 
Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Morris v. New 
York, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25038 (E.D. N.Y. March 29, 2008) (holding that evidence 
of prior sexual assaults are presumptively admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 413 in a federal 
prosecution for sexual assault); State v. Keith, 2005 UT App 445 ("breath test results are 
presumptively admissible and accurate if certain standards and safeguards are met"). 
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eyewitness testimony" expert testimony explaining the fallibility of eyewitness 
identifications should be presumed admissible absent a showing to the contrary by the 
State. IcL; see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 ("[DJespite its inherent 
unreliability, much eyewitness identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries. 
Juries seem most receptive to, and not inclined to discredit, testimony of a witness who 
states that he saw the defendant commit the crime."). As other courts have recognized, 
the problems with eyewitness identifications are "not within the common experience of 
most jurors, and . . . are counter-intuitive." Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 482. 
The proposed presumption of helpfulness is not only in accord with the science, 
but is also appropriate under the language of the current Rule 702, which provides that "if 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. The virtually undisputed science 
demonstrates that expert testimony about the deficiencies of eyewitness identifications 
will "assist the trier of fact." In effect, the proposed presumptive rule only recognizes 
what rule 702 already should require.40 
It is suggested that this court also clarify the relationship between a Long 
instruction and expert testimony and the role each plays. Under Rule 403, relevant 
40
 And even assuming that expert testimony would invade the province of the jury— 
which it would not—this fact would not provide a reason to exclude the testimony. 
Under Rule 704, expert testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704(a); see also State v. Chappie, 
660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (Ariz. 1983) ("the worry about invading the province of the jury has 
been solved for us by the provisions of Rule 704,. . . which permits opinion testimony 
even though 'it embraces an ultimate issue.'"). 
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evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the . . . 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Trial courts need guidance if they are to 
understand why expert testimony about the fallibility of eyewitness identification is not 
"cumulative of a Long instruction." For example, in the present case the trial court ruled 
that Dr. Dodd's testimony would be cumulative of the Long instruction. (R. 644:13.) 
Yet a jury instruction is not evidence. Without expert testimony regarding the weakness 
of eyewitness testimony, there will be no evidence before a jury on this central subject. 
Argument by counsel will be just that—counsel's statement, not evidence. Ferensic v. 
Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that although counsel may argue that 
eyewitness identifications are inherently unreliable, arguments by counsel are not 
evidence and thus, there is no evidence to support counsel's argument). Thus, jury 
instructions, cross-examination, and closing arguments "do not effectively substitute for 
expert testimony on [] inherent unreliability." Id. at 478, 481. This court should clarify 
that these other mechanisms, most importantly a Long instruction, are never cumulative 
of expert testimony under Rule 403. 
Another reason for this court to explain clearly the relationship between a Long 
instruction and expert testimony is exemplified by the trial court's ruling that Dr. Dodd's 
testimony would "confuse" the jury. (R. 644:12.) As discussed above, the empirical 
studies show that expert testimony assists jurors instead of confusing them. In fact, a 
Long instruction merely summaries the factors that expert testimony would elucidate in 
depth and would relate to the particular circumstances of a given case. Therefore, an 
explanation of this fact would guide all trial courts in applying Rule 403, under which the 
court below apparently excluded the testimony proffered by Mr. Clopten. Under Rule 
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403, probative evidence can be excluded if it is "substantially outweighed by the danger 
of . . . misleading the jury." Expert testimony, of the type discussed here, is certainly not 
likely to mislead the jury. The scientific evidence is that jurors are likely to be "misled" 
by their common intuitions without expert testimony to explain the science that calls 
these intuitions into question. 
Importantly, the proposed presumption of admissibility does not mandate that 
expert testimony be admitted in every case involving eyewitnesses. The State can rebut 
the presumption by showing that an explanation of the science concerning fallibility will 
not assist the jury in the particular case. For instance, if there is a long-standing 
relationship between the eyewitness and perpetrator, such that the witness's identification 
is not likely to be in error, the science may not be helpful to the jury in evaluating the 
eyewitness testimony. Similarly, if the scene of the crime was well lit and the eyewitness 
viewed the perpetrator for a substantial period of time under circumstances where 
mistake is unlikely, then expert testimony may not be helpful. If the State cannot rebut 
the presumption, however, then the trial court should conclude that the expert testimony 
will assist the trier of fact. 
This proposed approach will solve many of the problems inherent in the current 
practice of Utah trial courts of presuming that expert testimony should not be admitted. 
This court should hold that expert testimony is (i) presumptively helpful to the trier of 
fact under Rule 702, (ii) unlikely to confuse the jury under Rule 403, and (iii) never 
cumulative of a Long instruction under Rule 403. 
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IV. The Court Should Not Adopt a Per Se Rule 
There is a spectrum of approaches for dealing with expert testimony about the 
fallibility of eyewitness evidence. First, a decreasing number of courts exclude any such 
evidence. Commonwealth v. Bormack, 827 A.2d 503 (Pa. 2003); United States v. 
Holloway, 971 F.2d 675 (11th Cir. 1992). The courts abandoning this approach are 
taking cognizance of the relevant science discussed in this brief. State v. Copeland, 226 
S.W.3d 287, 300 (Tenn. 2007). 
Second, a growing group of courts require automatic admission of such expert 
testimony in narrow circumstances. Under this rule, "[wjhen an eyewitness identification 
of the defendant is a key element of the prosecutor's case but is not substantially 
corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers 
qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that 
could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known 
to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony." People 
v. Campbell 847 P.2d 228, 234-35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (citing People v. McDonald, 
690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984)). While this is referred to as a "per se rule," its application 
is so limited that, in practice, it is not as sweeping as it may appear at first glance. For 
example, the rule does not apply if any other corroborating evidence is presented.41 
41
 See State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003) ("It shall be an abuse of discretion 
for a district court to disallow expert testimony on eyewitness testimony when no 
substantial corroborating evidence exists."); State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218-24-
(Ariz. 1983) (holding it was an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where 
"identification [was] the one issue on which the guilt or innocence of defendant hinged"); 
People v. Campbell 847 P.2d 228, 234-35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (deeming the expert 
testimony admissible where, other than the eyewitness identification, there "was no other 
evidence linking defendant to the robbery"); State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 
1991) ("[A]n expert's testimony is admissible where, as here, the main issue is the 
identity of the perpetrator, the sole evidence of identity is eyewitness identification, and 
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Third, a further group leaves the matter to the discretion of trial courts. The 
approach advocated here is a version of this discretionary approach. While the proposed 
presumption would leave discretion to exclude such testimony in certain cases, it would 
require a particularized examination of the circumstances in light of the empirical 
findings of science before the evidence could be excluded. This approach best comports 
with the findings of the science. 
This court has rejected a per se admissibility rule and there is no reason for this 
court to reconsider that rejection. A per se approach does not comport with the science as 
well as does the proposed presumption. The per se rule is both too broad and too narrow. 
On the one hand, when science does not call into question an eyewitness's identification 
because of, for example, close familiarity with the perpetrator, then expert testimony may 
not assist the trier of fact under Rule 702. Trial courts should have discretion to exclude 
expert testimony under these circumstances. On the other hand, the need for expert 
testimony is not obviated by the presence of corroborating evidence. While other 
the identification is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent 
reliability."). 
42
 The presumption advocated here is consistent with providing trial courts discretion in 
determining whether to admit expert testimony, discretion recognized in a majority of 
jurisdictions. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 300 (Term. 2007); McMullen v. State, 
714 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1998); State v. Schutz, 579 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1998); 
Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116 (Mass. 1997); White v. State, 926 P.2d 291 
(Nev. 1996); People v. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1990); State v. Whaley, 406 
S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1991); State v. Moon, 726 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Engberg 
v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995); 
United Sates v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 
1308 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976). 
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eyewitness testimony is not considered "corroborating evidence," almost any other 
evidence is considered corroborating evidence sufficient to make the per se rule 
inapplicable. As described in Part 11(B), the "powerful impact" eyewitness testimony has 
on jurors suggests that jurors are likely to place great weight on extremely unreliable 
eyewitness identifications even when, without the identification, they would be unlikely 
to convict on circumstantial evidence. (Pet. Apx. at 150.)44; Watkins v. Sowders, 449 
U.S. 341, 352 (1981); Ferensic v. Birkett 501 F.3d 469, 482 (6th Cir. 2007). The 
presence of "corroborating evidence," then, does not solve the problems with eyewitness 
identification. (Pet. Apx. at 447-49.)45 The proposed presumption better conforms to the 
science. 
Other jurisdictions have not adopted the presumption advocated here. However, 
courts across the country are increasingly recognizing the importance of expert 
testimony. For example, Tennessee recently abandoned its per se rule against the 
43
 See e.g.. People v. Campbell 847 P.2d 228, 233 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that it was 
an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where there were two eyewitnesses), 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that it was an 
abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where there were twelve eyewitnesses); 
People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1984) (holding that it was an abuse of 
discretion to exclude expert testimony where there were seven eyewitnesses); United 
States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000) ("expert testimony should be 
admitted in the precise situation presented to the trial court in this case—that is, when 
there is no other exculpatory evidence presented against the Defendant with the exception 
of a small number of eyewitness identifications"). 
44
 Roger B. Handberg, supra note 11, at 1043. 
45
 Richard S. Schmechel, Timothy P. OToole, Catharine Easterly, & Elizabeth F. Loftus, 
Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 
Jurimetrics 177, 188-190 (Winter 2006) (recognizing that trial court's are ill equipped to 
determine whether so-called corroborating evidence is sufficient to preclude expert 
testimony on eyewitness identifications at the pre-trial stage and that it is often difficult to 
determine whether the corroborating evidence arose independently of the eyewitness 
identification). 
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admission of expert testimony. In doing so, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized the 
research indicating "that neither cross-examination nor jury instructions on the issue are 
sufficient to educate the jury on the problems with eyewitness identification." State v. 
Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 300 (Tenn. 2007). As the Third Circuit has explained, "[t]o 
the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great confidence in an inaccurate 
identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an effective way to reveal the 
weakness in a witness' recollection of an event." United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1230 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985). The Colorado Court of Appeals has agreed: "[t]he courts 
permitting expert eyewitness testimony on these matters do so in part because there is no 
other effective way to reveal any weakness in the eyewitness identification." People v. 
Campbell 847 P.2d 228, 233 (Colo. App. 1992). Jury instructions—the very foundation 
of this court's current jurisprudence—while helpful, are inadequate. People v. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1984) (vacated in part on other grounds) ("The 
instruction contains only a few general remarks on the topic; it does not even begin to 
convey to the jury the specific data on the eyewitness identification process that [the 
expert's] testimony would have provided, a task in any event beyond the function of 
instructions.") (emphasis added). 
The proposed presumption educates trial courts to the importance of expert 
testimony while continuing to provide discretion to trial courts to determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony. 
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V. Had the Trial Court Applied the Presumption, It Would Have Allowed 
Dr. Dodd to Testify 
Under the presumption, Dr. Dodd's testimony should have been admitted. First, 
the State presented several eyewitnesses to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At 
least two of these eyewitnesses were strangers to Mr. Clopten and had seen Mr. Clopten 
and his companions only briefly prior to the concert. Second, Mr. Clopten sought to 
introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Dodd on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. 
The trial court recognized that Dr. Dodd was qualified to provide the proffered expert 
testimony. (R. 639:6.) 
The only issue therefore would have been whether the State could have overcome 
the presumption. It could not have in this case. Dr. Dodd was prepared to testify about 
the science of eyewitness identifications relevant to the circumstances present here. 
Specifically, Dr. Dodd would have testified about (i) the impact of an identification by a 
person of a race different than the race of the perpetrator; (ii) the impact of the presence 
of a weapon; (iii) the effect of the presence of stress, trauma, and violence; (iv) the stages 
of memory and their effects on facial recognition; (v) the effect of the show-up 
procedures and statements made by officers before and after the identifications; and 
(vi) the relevance of witness confidence. 
Because the record indicates that the science concerning eyewitness identifications 
is relevant to the type of eyewitness testimony in this case, the State did not overcome the 
presumption on admissibility. In addition, the trial court's stated ground for excluding 
Dr. Dodd's testimony—that it was cumulative of the Long instruction—is not a 
legitimate basis to exclude expert testimony that would otherwise assist the jury. The 
trial court therefore abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony in this case. 
9346287 37 
VI. The Trial Court's Error Was Not Harmless Because Dr. Dodd's Testimony 
May Have Led to a Different Outcome 
The exclusion of Dr. Dodd's testimony was not harmless. Harmful error exists 
when there is a reasonable likelihood that a trial without the errors "may well have 
resulted in a different jury determination." S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382 (Utah 
1996). A "reasonable likelihood" of a better outcome exists when the court's confidence 
in the verdict is undermined. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
"[Confidence in the verdict" is legitimately undermined at a point "substantially short" 
of where a court might conclude that a different result was "more probable than not." Id. 
at 920. 
Erroneously excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony was harmful. As one court 
explained, "eyewitness misidentification is the single most important factor leading to 
wrongful convictions in the United States," a fact that "strongly supports the conclusion 
that excluding [the expert testimony] had a substantial and injurious effect" on the 
defendant. Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 482. This is especially true here, where Dr. Dodd's 
testimony would have highlighted a number of problems with the eyewitness 
identifications, including the following. 
First, because a gun was present, the negative effect of weapon focus is directly 
applicable to the eyewitness identifications in this case. This is particularly true where 
Ms. Pantoja described the gun and a vivid memory of sparks flying from the gun. 
(R. 645:81.) Just as the research suggests, Ms. Pantoja was apparently focusing on the 
gun, not the shooter. (Pet. Apx. at 104.)46 Weapon focus undermines the reliability of 
the eyewitness identifications. 
46
 Fradella, supra note 6, at 14. 
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Second, the event was a homicide, a violent event that was traumatic for the 
eyewitnesses. Ms. Pantoja was hysterical following the shooting and, after a moment of 
shock, Ms. Valdez immediately ran in the other direction in a panic. (R. 633:79; 
646:250.) The stressful nature of an event can influence an eyewitness's ability to 
perceive and accurately recall the identity of a perpetrator. 
Third, the eyewitness identifications were made by individuals of a race different 
than Mr. Clopten, Mr. White, and their two other companions. Cross-racial 
identifications are particularly unreliable. 
Fourth, because Mr. Fuailemaa pointed out Mr. Clopten to Ms. Pantoja prior to the 
concert and told her that Mr. Clopten had problems with "the homies" in prison, 
Ms. Pantoja's bias toward Mr. Clopten may have affected her memory and perception of 
the event. Both memory and perception can be affected by expectations and stereotypes, 
including "cultural biases, personal prejudices,... prior information, and expectations 
induced by motivational states, among others."47 (Pet. Apx. at 104.)48 
Accordingly, because "witnesses unconsciously reconstruct what has occurred 
from what they assume must have occurred," Ms. Pantoja may have reconstructed her 
memory unconsciously based on her belief that Mr. Clopten and Mr. Fuailemaa had 
previous problems and Mr. Clopten was wearing a red sweatshirt like the shooter. (Pet. 
Apx. at 385.)49 (emphasis added). Put more succinctly, "[w]hat we expect to see clearly 
See also Woocher, supra note 16, at 980 (Pet. Apx. at 385) (recognizing that this 
phenomenon "compensate^] for the perceptual selectivity made necessary by the brain's 
limitations"). 
Fradella, supra note 6, at 14. 
49
 Woocher, supra note 16, at 980. 
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influences what we think we see." (Pet. Apx. at 104.) Had the jury heard Dr. Dodd's 
testimony, it might have recognized this possibility and determined that another 
individual—Freddie White, who confessed to the shooting—may have been the shooter. 
This is especially likely given the red sweatshirt police found in the SUV where 
Mr. White was seated. 
Fifth, apart from biases Ms. Pantoja held prior to the shooting, post-event 
information may also have impacted her memory. "Postevent information can . . . change 
a witness's memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a 
previously acquired memory." (Pet. Apx. at 10 (alteration in original).)51 Immediately 
after the shooting, Ms. Pantoja's descriptions were vague, but became more clear over 
time. (R. 645: 86, 90-93; Compare R. 641:18 with R. 645:46 (demonstrating a shift in 
Ms. Pantoja's description of the shooter from "the one in red" to "It's the guy in all 
red").) For instance, Ms. Pantoja's reported memory about Mr. Clopten's hairline 
appears to have been added to her memory after viewing him at the show-up and photo 
array. All other witnesses reported that the shooter's hood was up when the shooting 
occurred. But Ms. Pantoja reported to the jury that she absolutely remembered his 
hairline. ICnowledge of the effects of post-event information altering memory may have 
alerted the jury to this problem and caused them to focus more on the inconsistency 
between her memory and the testimony of other witnesses. 
Sixth, the show-up may have compromised the identification of Ms. Pantoja 
because Mr. Clopten was the only individual wearing a red sweatshirt at the time. u[I]n 
50
 Fradella, supra note 6, at 15. 
51
 Cohen, supra note 16, at 246. 
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an identification procedure where the suspect stands out, it cannot be determined if the 
eyewitness selected the suspect because he or she recognized the suspect as the 
perpetrator of the crime, or because of the biasing effect of the fillers in the identification 
procedure. In such circumstances, an eyewitness's identification of the suspect does not 
constitute forensically valid evidence of the suspect's guilt." (Pet. Apx. at 335.)52 Had 
Mr. White been wearing the red sweatshirt found in the SUV during the show-up, 
Ms. Pantoja may have identified him as the shooter and then later "remembered" his 
distinct features as those of the shooter.53 
Seventh, the witnesses focused on the red sweatshirt and not the shooter's facial 
features, but Mr. Clopten's sweatshirt differed significantly from the eyewitnesses' 
memories. And another red sweatshirt resembling the eyewitnesses' descriptions was 
found in the car and ignored by investigators after Ms. Pantoja identified Mr. Clopten at 
the show-up where he alone was wearing a red sweatshirt. 
Finally, any confidence in the identifications expressed by the witnesses would 
have been accepted by the jury as indicative of the identification's accuracy, at least in 
the absence of expert testimony concerning the irrelevance of confidence to the accuracy 
of an identification. The jurors likely did not attempt to check their intuitions that run 
counter to the science, intuitions which could have impacted their views of reliability of 
the eyewitness testimony in this case. Particularly with regard to the affect of stress and 
weapon-focus, the research demonstrates that the jurors likely assumed that these factors 
52
 Richard A. Wise, Criminal Law: A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 Crim. L. 
& Criminology 807, 859 (2007). 
53
 In addition, suggestive statements made by police that the suspect would indeed be 
present at the show-up also may have undermined the reliability of Ms. Pantoja's 
identification. 
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had the opposite affect of aiding memory rather than detracting from it. Because the jury 
did not hear any of this scientific evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome of the proceedings was affected. 
Importantly, there were eyewitnesses whose testimony suggests that Mr. White, 
not Mr. Clopten, was the shooter—Mr. and Mrs. Aimone. Each of these witnesses was 
outside the stressful situation and never saw the weapon. What they did observe was four 
individuals fleeing toward the SUV after hearing gunshots. Each of these witnesses 
testified that a man wearing a red jacket entered the passenger side of the vehicle. It is 
undisputed that Mr. Clopten was the driver of the vehicle. Two other individuals, one of 
whom was Mr. White, entered the passenger side of the vehicle. 
There was ample evidence at trial supporting Mr. Clopten's theory:54 
(i) Mr. White's confessions, (ii) testimony that Mr. White had a gun at the scene of the 
shooting, (iii) the presence of an additional red sweatshirt near Mr. White's seat in the 
vehicle, (iv) the Aimone's testimony that £in individual in a red jacket entered the 
passenger side of the vehicle, and (v) Ms. Valdez's companion's assertion that the 
shooter was not the driver of the vehicle. Had Dr. Dodd testified, the verdict may well 
The other evidence consisted of conflicting confessions and the testimony of Mr. 
Hamby. And although Mr. Hamby was familiar with Mr. Clopten because he spent 
several hours with Mr. Clopten that day, a jury likely would have questioned his 
credibility if they had been made aware of the fallibility of the other eyewitness 
identifications. (R. 633:16-18.) This is true especially in light of the testimony by 
several witnesses that Mr. White had confessed to being the shooter, the presence of the 
additional red sweatshirt discovered in the vehicle, Mr. Hamby's testimony that 
Mr. White also had a gun, Mr. Hamby's failure to appear at the trial, and the suggestive 
police questioning of Mr. Hamby. (R. 633:27; 646:297, 319-20, 326-33; 647:491-92, 
497-98, 500, 505-07, 522-23.) 
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have been different. The case should be remanded for a new trial in which Dr. Dodd can 
testify. 
Conclusion 
"Many jurists agree that eyewitness identifications are the most devastating and 
persuasive evidence in criminal trials." United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 312 (6th 
Cir. 2000). Mr. Clopten asks this court to recognize the scientific research demonstrating 
eyewitness identifications can be inherently unreliable under certain conditions. This 
court should announce a presumption that expert testimony concerning the fallibility of 
eyewitness identification assists the trier of fact. This presumption will shift the burden 
to the State to demonstrate that expert testimony will be unhelpful in a particular case. 
Had the trial court applied this presumption here, Dr. Dodd would have testified. 
And had Dr. Dodd testified, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have 
reached a different verdict. The court should reverse and remand for a new trial. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2008. 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
Michae^Zmimerman 
Troy L\ Booher 
Katherine Carreau 
Attorneys for Mr. Clopten 
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